This distinction clarifies the view of those who say, “If, by the qualification, he intends the meaning of His words”:

“Never say of anything, ‘I will do that tomorrow,’ except, ‘If Allah wills.’”

For a person is commanded not to say, “I will certainly do it tomorrow,” without saying, “If Allah wills.”

The foregoing discussion makes clear that the qualification which removes the obligation of expiation makes conditional only the oath’s assertive meaning, whether that meaning stands alone or is combined with another. It does not make conditional its meaning as a demand, whether that meaning stands alone or is combined with another. Failing to fulfil a demand does not entail expiation; rather, expiation is entailed when an assertion proves contrary to fact. This is because the obligation is removed only when invoking Allah’s will makes the statement conditional, and only something that has not yet occurred can be made conditional, unlike something that has already occurred.

Hence we know that this qualification does not nullify performative declarations at all, whether pronouncements of divorce or otherwise, just as it does not remove what a demand entails. From this it should be inferred that these formulas are governed predominantly by the rules of performative declarations, since conditional qualification is inapplicable to them. In all such cases, the qualification expresses affirmation, not conditionality, as when someone says, “This happened by Allah’s will,” or, “It happened through Allah’s power.”

The issue of “qualification in oaths” is to be understood on this basis. If it concerns one’s ultimate outcome, it retains its usual sense, because applying the designation implies entitlement to Paradise, as Ibn Masʿūd stated. Muʿādh’s companion disagreed with him on this, adopting a valid interpretation. Omitting the qualification is permissible, although including it is better