At times, his purpose is to make his intention conditional, meaning: “If Allah wills, I now intend and seek it; otherwise, I do not.” In this case, he cannot properly be said to intend it, and this alone does not remove the obligation of expiation. This is like a man saying to his wife, “You are divorced if you wish,” and her replying, “I wish it if you wish.” Since an act of willing cannot validly be made conditional, the same applies here. Whenever he says this, his intention has not been established. He is like someone who, when asked for something, says: “I shall give it to you, if Allah wills.” He has made no promise.

If he intends this meaning in an oath, that is valid, but it does not remove the obligation of expiation. Failure to fulfil the request is not what makes expiation obligatory; rather, it is the contradiction of the assertion. Even an unconditional assertion unaccompanied by any request would entail expiation. Thus, the most this achieves is to remove the element of request and urging from the oath.

Second, his purpose may be to make the assertion conditional. The meaning is: “My standing up will occur if Allah wills,” or, “Your standing up will occur if Allah wills.” Thus: “I assert that it will occur if Allah wills its occurrence; if He does not will it, I make no assertion that it will occur.”

If he makes no such assertion, there is no contradiction and hence no breach of oath, even if his present intention to do it is firm. This is the meaning that removes the obligation of expiation. It is as though he said: “I am uncertain whether it will occur, so I do not assert its occurrence unconditionally. I assert only that it will occur under this condition.”

This is like saying: “I shall certainly stand up if Zayd arrives,” or, “if you give me a hundred,” and similar expressions. It is a promise or a threat contingent upon a condition, even though the person making the promise or threat presently intends to carry it out.

For this reason, we have said that his saying, “I shall certainly fast tomorrow in Ramadan, if Allah wills,” does not impair his intention, because the condition qualifies the assertion, not the intention. Some jurists, however,