for it is a pure request reinforced by invoking Allah, as when he says: “I ask you by Allah to do this,” or “I ask you by Allah not to do this.” But if the person singled out by the request or prohibition is someone whom the speaker considers very likely to comply—such as his slave, wife, or child—that person is like the speaker himself: the oath contains both a request and an assertion. Since that person ordinarily obeys him, this is comparable to his own compliance with his intentions. In either case, he requests the act and couples that request with an assertion that it will occur.

Thus, his saying, “I shall certainly stand up tomorrow,” entails two things: first, “I intend to stand up tomorrow”; and second, “Standing up will occur tomorrow.” This differs from a purely declarative oath, which means, “It will occur,” and from an oath that is purely a request, which means, “I want you, and ask you, to stand up.” A breach of oath arises not from failure to fulfil the request—as explained above regarding a pure request—but from events contradicting the assertion, just as with a purely declarative statement about the future.

The exception makes the act conditional upon Allah’s will, so the meaning becomes: “This will certainly occur if Allah wills.” If Allah does not will it, the speaker has made no assertion that it will occur; hence there is no contradiction and no breach of oath. For this reason, the exception is valid. An example of a purely declarative statement is his saying:

“I shall certainly go in to ninety women tonight, and each woman shall surely bear a horseman who fights in the cause of Allah.”

Giving birth is not an act within his power to perform. Likewise, you may say: “By Allah, Zayd will certainly come, if Allah wills.”

Thus, a person who says, “I shall certainly do such-and-such, if Allah wills,” may have one of three intentions: