and it resembles his saying, “This is an endowment.”

If, however, he says, “This slave is free,” or “This woman is divorced,” this constitutes a relinquishment of rights, like saying, “So-and-so is discharged from liability for such-and-such, for the blood of so-and-so, or for slandering me.” For relinquishing claims concerning bloodshed, property, and honour belongs to the same category as relinquishing proprietary rights, as in marital rights and ownership of slaves.

If he says, “If I do this, divorce shall be binding upon me,” “Emancipation shall be binding upon me,” “My wife shall be divorced,” or “My slaves shall be free,” and we hold that this entails one of two alternatives, then he has the choice between that consequence taking effect and expiation becoming obligatory. This is like his saying, “Then this property shall be charity,” or “This camel shall be a sacrificial offering.”

A comparable case is his saying, “When the sun rises, either my slaves shall be free or my wives shall be divorced,” if we hold that the choice rests with him. His choosing either alternative is equivalent to his choosing between the stipulated consequence taking effect and expiation becoming obligatory. Another example is when a man embraces Islam while married to more than four women, or to two sisters, and chooses one of the sisters.

In these cases, where separation is one of the two binding alternatives—whether separation from a specified individual or separation as such—no new declaration of divorce is needed. Yet divorce does not become the binding alternative without something that makes it so, as in the comparable cases mentioned. Then, if he chooses divorce, does it take effect from the time of his choice or from the time he broke his oath? The ruling is to be derived by analogy with comparable cases.

Thus, if, in cases involving a vow prompted by obstinacy and anger, he says, “I have chosen