between parting with her and retaining her on grounds of a defect or the like, and as in the case of an emancipated woman married to his slave? Or does expiation not become obligatory at all until divorce is no longer possible?

The answer is that the ruling is the same as if he had said, “Then one-third of my wealth shall be given in charity or as a sacrificial offering,” or something similar. The view most consistent with analogy is that he may defer choosing between the two, unless he says or does something indicating his acceptance of one of them, as with other rights of choice.

Section

According to the well-known position in our school, a “vow prompted by obstinacy and anger” entails one of two things: either offering expiation or performing the conditionally stipulated act.

There is no doubt that statements such as, “If I do such-and-such, I shall be obliged to pray two units of prayer, give a thousand in charity, perform Hajj, or fast for a month,” entail an obligation when the specified act occurs. He therefore has a choice between undertaking this obligation and becoming obliged to offer expiation. If he does not undertake the conditionally stipulated obligation, expiation becomes obligatory. Thus, one of the two obligations is binding upon him, each becoming binding if the other is not undertaken, as with an obligation that allows a choice between alternatives.

The same applies if he says, “If I do such-and-such, I shall be obliged to free this slave, divorce this woman, give charity, or make a sacrificial offering.” This establishes that the slave is due to be freed, the property given in charity, and the sacrificial camel offered in sacrifice.

If he were instead to make this unconditional, saying, “This property is charity, this camel is a sacrificial offering, and I am obliged to free this slave,” would it thereby pass out of his ownership, or would its transfer out of his ownership merely become obligatory? There is disagreement on this.