Majmu' al-FatawaIbn Taimiya

and sacrificial offerings may pass into other people’s ownership, unlike a wife or slave. This distinction, however, has no bearing on the ruling.

Likewise, if someone says, “Divorce is incumbent upon me—I shall certainly do such-and-such,” or, “Divorce binds me—I shall certainly do such-and-such,” this is like saying, “Hajj is incumbent upon me—I shall certainly do such-and-such.” Here, he has made the obligation to divorce, rather than divorce actually taking effect, the subject of his oath. It is as though he had said, “If I do such-and-such, I am obliged to divorce.” Thus, in some forms of oaths involving divorce, the oath is expressed in terms of an obligation, just as some forms of oaths involving vows are expressed in terms of something actually taking effect.

As for the second answer, we say: suppose that what is made conditional upon the act here is divorce and manumission actually taking effect, whereas what is made conditional there is the obligation to give charity, perform Hajj, fast, or present a sacrificial offering. Does fulfilment of the condition not entail that this obligation becomes binding? Yet expiation for an oath suffices for him. Likewise, upon fulfilment of the condition, this obligation does not become binding; rather, expiation for an oath suffices for him when the condition takes effect. If that obligation does not become binding upon fulfilment of the condition, then likewise the divorce or manumission does not actually take effect upon its fulfilment.

This is comparable to someone saying, “I am a Jew, a Christian, or an unbeliever if I do such-and-such.” What is made conditional here is actually entering unbelief upon fulfilment of the condition. Yet, by agreement, when the condition is fulfilled, he does not enter unbelief. Rather, he must either offer expiation for an oath or nothing is required of him.

If, however, he were to declare outright, “I am a Jew, a Christian, or an unbeliever,” he would thereby enter unbelief. This is comparable to his declaring outright, “My slave is free,” “My wife is divorced,” “This camel is a sacrificial offering,” “I am bound to present a sacrificial offering,” or, “I am bound to fast

وَالْهَدْيَ يَتَمَلَّكُهُمَا النَّاسُ بِخِلَافِ الزَّوْجَةِ وَالْعَبْدِ. وَهَذَا لَا تَأْثِيرَ لَهُ وَكَذَلِكَ لَوْ قَالَ: عَلَيَّ الطَّلَاقُ لَأَفْعَلَنَّ كَذَا أَوْ الطَّلَاقُ يَلْزَمُنِي لَأَفْعَلَنَّ كَذَا فَهُوَ كَقَوْلِهِ: عَلَيَّ الْحَجُّ لَأَفْعَلَنَّ كَذَا فَهُوَ جَعَلَ الْمَحْلُوفَ بِهِ هَاهُنَا وُجُوبَ الطَّلَاقِ؛ لَا وُجُودَهُ كَأَنَّهُ قَالَ: إنْ فَعَلْت كَذَا فَعَلَيَّ أَنْ أُطَلِّقَ. فَبَعْضُ صُوَرِ الْحَلِفِ بِالطَّلَاقِ يَكُونُ الْمَحْلُوفُ بِهِ صِيغَةَ وُجُوبٍ. كَمَا أَنَّ بَعْضَ صُوَرِ الْحَلِفِ بِالنَّذْرِ يَكُونُ الْمَحْلُوفُ بِهِ صِيغَةَ وُجُودٍ. و " أَمَّا الْجَوَابُ الثَّانِي " فَنَقُولُ: هَبْ أَنَّ الْمُعَلَّقَ بِالْفِعْلِ هُنَا وُجُودُ الطَّلَاقِ وَالْعِتْقِ وَالْمُعَلَّقَ هُنَاكَ وُجُوبُ الصَّدَقَةِ وَالْحَجِّ وَالصِّيَامِ وَالْإِهْدَاءِ أَلَيْسَ مُوجَبُ الشَّرْطِ ثُبُوتَ هَذَا الْوُجُوبِ؟ بَلْ يُجْزِئُهُ كَفَّارَةُ يَمِينٍ كَذَلِكَ عِنْدَ الشَّرْطِ لَا يَثْبُتُ هَذَا الْوُجُوبُ بَلْ يَجْزِيهِ كَفَّارَةُ يَمِينٍ عِنْدَ وُجُوبِ الشَّرْطِ فَإِنْ كَانَ عِنْدَ الشَّرْطِ لَا يَثْبُتُ ذَلِكَ الْوُجُوبُ كَذَلِكَ عِنْدَ الشَّرْطِ لَا يَثْبُتُ هَذَا الْوُجُودُ؛ بَلْ كَمَا لَوْ قَالَ: هُوَ يَهُودِيٌّ أَوْ نَصْرَانِيٌّ أَوْ كَافِرٌ إنْ فَعَلَ كَذَا؛ فَإِنَّ الْمُعَلَّقَ هُنَا وُجُودُ الْكُفْرِ عِنْدَ الشَّرْطِ؛ ثُمَّ إذَا وُجِدَ الشَّرْطُ لَمْ يُوجَدْ الْكُفْرُ بِالِاتِّفَاقِ؛ بَلْ يَلْزَمُهُ كَفَّارَةُ يَمِينٍ أَوْ لَا يَلْزَمُهُ شَيْءٌ. وَلَوْ قَالَ ابْتِدَاءً: هُوَ يَهُودِيٌّ أَوْ نَصْرَانِيٌّ أَوْ كَافِرٌ يَلْزَمُهُ الْكُفْرُ؛ بِمَنْزِلَةِ قَوْلِهِ ابْتِدَاءً: عَبْدِي حُرٌّ؛ وَامْرَأَتِي طَالِقٌ؛ وَهَذِهِ الْبَدَنَةُ هَدْيٌ وَعَلَيَّ هَدْيٌ؛ وَعَلَيَّ صَوْمُ

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