those who came later fashioned oaths from these concepts and linked one clause to the other, in the manner of the oaths sworn by the Muslim Companions and by the Arabs.

There is no difference between the two except that saying, “If I do it, my wealth shall be given in charity,” entails an obligation to give charity upon performing the act, whereas saying, “then my wife shall be divorced,” entails the divorce itself taking effect. Thus, the wording entails that divorce takes effect merely upon fulfilment of the condition, even if he does not subsequently pronounce a divorce; it does not entail that the charitable disposition takes effect until he actually makes it.

The distinction relied upon by the jurists who differentiate between the two may be answered in two ways. First, by disputing the alleged distinguishing feature in some of the original cases used as bases for analogy and in some forms of the subsidiary cases used in the same way. Second, by showing that the distinction has no bearing on the ruling.

As for the first: if he says, “If I do such-and-such, my wealth shall be given in charity,” or “then I shall be in a state of consecration,” or “then my camel shall be a sacrificial offering,” what is made conditional is the actual dedication as charity, entry into consecration, and dedication as a sacrificial offering—not the obligation to undertake them. Likewise, in saying, “then my slave shall be free and my wife shall be divorced,” what is made conditional is divorce and manumission actually taking effect, not their becoming obligatory.

For this reason, the jurists of our school and others disagreed over whether, when someone says, “This is a sacrificial offering,” or “This is charity for Allah,” it passes out of his ownership. According to those who hold that it does, this is analogous to his wife and slave passing out of his ownership. The most that can be said in this regard is that property given in charity