Thus al-Athram, al-Khiraqī and others regard it as his position, whereas al-Khallāl, his associate and others do not. The precise assessment is that it follows by analogy from his position and is a necessary implication of it. It therefore does not have the same standing as a position explicitly reported from him, nor does it have the same standing as something that is not a necessary implication of his position. Rather, it occupies an intermediate position between the two. This applies where it is possible for that implication not to bind him.

Furthermore, Allah has legislated divorce, permitting it, commanding it, or making it binding when the person concerned pronounces it. The same applies to manumission and vows. These legal acts—vows, divorce and manumission—entail certain things becoming obligatory or forbidden for a person. Such obligations and prohibitions become binding upon him only if he intends them or intends their cause. If these words pass his lips unintentionally, nothing becomes binding upon him, by agreement. If he utters them under coercion, their legal effect does not bind him according to our school and the majority of scholars, as indicated by the Sunnah and reports from the Companions. His sole purpose is to ward off the harm threatened against him: he intends neither their legal effect nor to utter them of his own accord.

The same applies when someone swears an oath, saying, “If I do not do such-and-such, Hajj or divorce shall be binding upon me.” He does not intend to commit himself to Hajj or divorce, nor has he made a direct declaration imposing either. His purpose is merely to urge himself to perform that act or to prevent himself from doing it, just as the person under coercion seeks to ward off the harm threatened against him.

He then says, as a forceful means of urging or restraining himself, “If I do such-and-such, this shall be binding upon me,” or, “This shall be forbidden to me.” Because he is so averse to incurring that obligation or prohibition, he makes it conditional upon that act. His intention is to prevent both, not to bring about either the legal effect or its cause. Since he intends neither the legal effect nor its cause, but instead intends that the legal effect should not occur, it does not follow that this effect must become binding upon him.