He thus distinguished oaths involving divorce and manumission from oaths involving vows, on the grounds that neither divorce nor manumission can be discharged through expiation. He followed what had reached him on this matter from Ibn ʿUmar and Ibn ʿAbbās, setting it against the reports concerning expiation from Ibn ʿUmar, Hafsah, and Zaynab, especially since al-Taymī alone transmitted this additional wording.
Sālih ibn Ahmad said:
“My father said, ‘What if someone says, “My slave woman is free if I do not do such-and-such”?’
“He said, ‘Ibn ʿUmar and Ibn ʿAbbās said that she becomes free. But if someone says, “All my wealth is for the poor,” without including his slave woman, expiation is due. These two cases are not alike. Do you not see that Ibn ʿUmar distinguished between them? Neither manumission nor divorce can be discharged through expiation.’”
The followers of Abū Hanīfah say that if a man says, “My wealth is for the poor,” he gives it in charity to the poor; and if he says, “My wealth is charity for so-and-so.”
They distinguished between saying, “If I do such-and-such, my wealth is charity,” or, “I must perform Hajj,” and saying, “My wife is divorced,” or, “My slave is free.” In the former case, the legal consequence of the statement is that charity or Hajj becomes obligatory, not that the charity has actually been given or the Hajj performed. Thus, when the condition makes this obligatory, expiation serves as a substitute for that obligation, just as it serves as a substitute for other obligations. In the early days of Islam, it served as a substitute for obligatory fasting, and it remains a substitute for fasting for those unable to fast. Likewise, it serves as a substitute for fasting that remained due from a deceased person. When an obligation rests upon a person, it is possible to give him the choice between fulfilling it and performing something else in its place.
As for manumission and divorce, the legal consequence of the statement is that they actually take effect. Once the condition is fulfilled, manumission or divorce takes effect; and once either has taken effect, it cannot subsequently be undone, since neither admits of rescission. This differs from saying, “If I do such-and-such, I undertake before Allah to free a slave,” for he