such-and-such, or not do such-and-such”; or, “If I do such-and-such, my slaves shall be free,” or, “If I do not do it, my slaves shall be free.”

Those earlier jurists who held that vows made in contention or anger must be fulfilled also hold that divorce and manumission take effect in this case. As for the majority, who held that expiation suffices for vows made in contention or anger, they differed on this question. No statement concerning oaths invoking divorce has reached me from any of the Companions; statements on this matter have reached us only from the Successors and those after them, since such oaths were a later development, unknown in the Companions’ time. Statements concerning oaths invoking manumission have, however, reached us, as we shall mention, Allah willing.

The Successors and those after them thus differed concerning oaths invoking divorce and manumission. Some distinguished these from oaths involving vows, saying that divorce and manumission take effect when the oath is broken, and that expiation does not suffice, unlike an oath involving a vow. This is what ʿAwf reported from al-Hasan. It is also the position of al-Shāfiʿī, Ahmad—as explicitly transmitted from him—Ishāq ibn Rāhawayh, Abū ʿUbayd, and others.

Harb al-Kirmānī reported from Muʿtamir ibn Sulaymān, from ʿAwf, that al-Hasan said:

“Every oath, however weighty—even one pledging Hajj and ʿumrah, or dedicating one’s wealth to the poor—is simply an oath, provided it does not involve divorcing a woman who was his wife when he swore, or freeing a male slave whom he owned when he swore.”

Ismāʿīl ibn Saʿīd said:

“I asked Ahmad ibn Hanbal about a man who says to his son, ‘If I speak to you, my wife is divorced and my slave is free.’

“He replied, ‘This does not have the legal standing of an oath; it is binding upon him whether he is angry or content.’”

Sulaymān ibn Dāwūd said:

“Breaking the oath makes the divorce and manumission binding upon him.”

Abū Khaythama held the same view. It was stated by