but only through a confession intended to secure the inviolability of his property and life, akin to a claim brought against a nominal defendant.

“Second”: Ruling that his life and property are inviolable is obligatory according to al-Shāfiʿī and the majority, even if he makes no confession. Indeed, in the absence of legally valid evidence and a confession, it is obligatory by consensus.

“Third”: The ruling is undoubtedly valid.

“Fourth”: Even if the ruling were open to juristic disagreement, that disagreement would be resolved by its ratification by the enforcing authority.

“Fifth”: No judge would award this man’s property to the public treasury even if his disbelief and subsequent acceptance of Islam were established—even if that disbelief consisted of blasphemous abuse. How, then, could this be done when his disbelief has not been established? And how could it be done when a ruling has already affirmed the inviolability of his property? Indeed, the schools of Mālik and Ahmad, which are invoked in cases such as this, are among those furthest from awarding such a person’s property to the public treasury. This is because, in their view, a confession of this kind is a confession made as a protective expedient, to which no weight is given, and because of their known position concerning one who commits blasphemous abuse. And Allah knows best.