Qādī ‘Iyād had earlier discussed the case of someone who utters an insult while quoting another person or transmitting it from someone else. He said:

“In this case, one must consider how he relates it and the circumstances surrounding his words. The ruling varies accordingly, taking one of four forms: obligatory, recommended, disliked or prohibited.”

He then explained that such reporting is permissible when offered as testimony or for a similar purpose involving the application of the prescribed legal ruling to the speaker, or to expose the vileness and failings of the person who uttered it—as opposed to relating it for neither of these purposes. He said:

“No one may make sport of the honor of the Prophet, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, or bandy about words disparaging him, whether recounting them or transmitting them from others, without a permissible purpose recognized by Islamic law.”

Qādī ‘Iyād’s words thus make clear that what the man in question said does not fall into this category, since it concerns matters of scholarly disagreement. They also make clear that no one may relate anything that does fall into this category without a permissible purpose recognized by Islamic law.

The man in question raised this point only to defend al-Ghazālī and other Muslim scholars like him against being declared unbelievers. It is well known that preventing the Muslim scholars who discussed this subject from being declared unbelievers—indeed, defending Muslim scholars against such accusations even when they have erred—is among the most rightful purposes recognized by Islamic law. Even supposing that someone defends a speaker against being declared an unbeliever because he believes him not to be one, seeking to protect him and support his Muslim brother, this would be a worthy purpose recognized by Islamic law. If he exercises his judgment in this and is correct, he receives two rewards; if he exercises his judgment and errs, he receives one reward.