years.” Such was the caliphate of the four caliphs.

As for Mu‘āwiyah, his caliphate was mingled with kingship. This does not detract from his caliphate, just as Solomon’s kingship did not detract from his prophethood, even though other prophets were poor.

I say: This implies that mingling the caliphate with kingship is permissible under our religious law and does not compromise moral uprightness, although an unalloyed caliphate is better.

Anyone who defends Mu‘āwiyah, regards him as exercising independent judgment in his affairs, and does not attribute sin to him must adopt one of two positions: either that mingling the caliphate with kingship is permissible, or that no blame attaches to him for doing so. This is therefore tenable if (1) he says that the prophetic caliphate is obligatory. If that were supposed—then, if he committed a misdeed, it was a major sin, even if it was a matter of religion; or because a transgressor is someone whose bad deeds outweigh his good deeds, which is not the case here. This is his mercy toward just kings, for among the Companions they are people whose example is followed.

As for the adherents of innovation, such as the Mu‘tazilites, they declare Mu‘āwiyah a transgressor for fighting Ali and for other matters, on the grounds that he committed a major sin and that this entails declaring him a transgressor. One of these two premises must therefore be rejected.

If this is admissible for kings, it is also admissible for judges, governors, and others like them. But if the prophetic caliphate is obligatory and attainable, yet has been abandoned, then abandoning an obligation is grounds for blame and punishment. Is abandoning it, then, a major sin or a minor one?