and I know of no one who has reported from any of the early generations that divorce made contingent upon a condition does not take effect. Disagreement on this is known only from some of the Shi‘a and from Ibn Hazm of the Zāhirī school.

These Shi‘a received legal rulings from some jurists of the Prophet’s household concerning someone whose intention was to swear an oath. They therefore assumed that every conditional pronouncement was of this kind. Likewise, some scholars of the majority received rulings from certain Companions and Successors stating that divorce made contingent upon a condition takes effect when that condition is fulfilled. They assumed that this was an oath, treating every conditional pronouncement as an oath, just like one intended as an oath. They did not distinguish between a conditional pronouncement intended as an oath and one intended to effect divorce, just as the former did not distinguish between the two with respect to divorce itself.

I know of no Companion who ruled that an oath makes divorce binding. Likewise, I know of none of them who issued a ruling concerning a conditional pronouncement intended as an oath. This is the position known from the majority of the early generations, and even Dāwūd and his followers adopted it. They distinguished between making divorce conditional with the intention of swearing an oath and doing so with the intention of effecting divorce, just as they distinguished between these two intentions when making a vow or something else conditional.

The distinction between them is clear. Someone swearing an oath does not want the consequence to occur, even if the condition is fulfilled. An example is a Muslim saying:

“If I do such-and-such, then I am a Jew or a Christian.”

He abhors disbelief even if the condition is fulfilled. He undertakes this commitment only so that it will not become binding and to deter himself from fulfilling the condition—not because he intends the consequence to occur when the condition is fulfilled.

The same applies to an oath involving Islam, as when a non-Muslim under Muslim protection says:

“If I do such-and-such, then I am a Muslim.”

Likewise, someone swearing an oath involving a vow, declaring something forbidden to himself, zihār (declaring his wife as forbidden to him as his mother), divorce, or emancipation may say:

“If I do such-and-such, then Hajj is incumbent upon me, my slaves are free, my wives are divorced, and my property is given in charity.”