four.

If someone inadvertently utters an oath concerning the future, or deliberately swears to something he believes to be as he has sworn, only for it to turn out otherwise, there are three positions concerning these two cases, corresponding to the three reports from Ahmad.

“The first” is that both are inconsequential, as held by the majority. This is the apparent position of Ahmad’s school and, according to one of the two approaches, is his undisputed position. According to this approach, he explained inconsequential oaths in these terms. This is also one of al-Shāfiʿī’s two positions.

“The second” is that he breaks his oath concerning the past, but not an oath uttered inadvertently. This, too, is one of al-Shāfiʿī’s two positions.

“The third” is the reverse, in accordance with the position of Abū Hanīfah and Mālik.

It is thus clear that someone whose mistake occurs when swearing the oath—who swears to something he believes to be as he has sworn, only for it to turn out otherwise—is treated, according to one of the two approaches, like someone who forgets or acts in ignorance. According to the other approach, he does not break his oath, without disagreement. The latter approach is the one well known among the leading scholars of Ahmad’s school.

Accordingly, someone who swears an oath invoking divorce concerning a matter he believes to be as he has sworn, only for it to turn out otherwise, does not break his oath if someone who forgets or acts in ignorance does not break an oath concerning the future. This follows either by treating the two cases alike or with even greater reason, depending on which of the two approaches is adopted. This is likewise how the discerning jurists have stated the matter.