has undertaken the obligation of divorce, emancipation, and pronouncing divorce. This is an act on his part that produces a legal consequence: divorce or emancipation taking effect. It is clear that undertaking the obligation to perform the act that entails the second legal consequence—its taking effect—is a stronger commitment than merely undertaking that it should take effect. In the former case, he has undertaken two legal consequences and two acts, whereas here he has undertaken only one of those consequences and one of those acts. Thus, what he undertakes in the disputed cases is only part of what he undertakes in the cases of consensus. If he need not be bound by the fuller undertaking, then all the more by the lesser one.

In the cases of consensus, if he intends the conditional statement as an oath, he has the choice between breaking his oath and offering expiation for it, and fulfilling what he has undertaken by effecting emancipation, divorce, or charity. The same applies, with even greater force, to what he undertakes in the disputed cases. Breaking this oath requires that the condition be fulfilled without the stipulated consequence occurring. He does not break it unless both requirements are met.

Thus, if he says, “If I do such-and-such, I am bound to perform Hajj, emancipate a slave, or pronounce divorce,” he does not break his oath unless he does that thing and the consequence stipulated upon it does not occur. If he brings about the stipulated consequence, he has not broken his oath, just as he would not have broken it had the condition not been fulfilled.

Even supposing that he has undertaken an act by saying, “If I do such-and-such, my slave becomes free, or my wife is divorced,” there is no difference between that and saying, “Then I am bound to emancipate my slave or divorce my wife.” Undertaking either of the two entails undertaking the other. Obligation requires that he perform the obligatory act, and prohibition entails that he may perform the forbidden act. Imposing an obligation entails its being obligatory; declaring something forbidden entails its being forbidden. Obligation requires performance; bringing a legal consequence into effect entails its taking effect and requires prohibition; and prohibition requires abstention. Thus, there is no difference between undertaking to impose an obligation