is what is made conditional, not the act itself. For if the act itself were made conditional, it would occur as soon as the verbally stipulated condition was fulfilled. Rather, what is made conditional is the obligation to emancipate a slave, perform Hajj, or the like. He then has the choice between accepting this obligation and offering expiation.

When he says, “If I do such-and-such, my slave is free,” the consequence is freedom itself, which entails the prohibition of keeping him enslaved. Likewise, divorce taking effect entails the prohibition of marital intimacy with her. Here, the prohibition follows from the consequence; it is not itself the consequence. This belongs to legal discourse establishing and declaring legal effects, whereas the former belongs to legal discourse imposing duties.

The same applies when he says, “If I do such-and-such, my wealth is charity.” He has undertaken that the wealth should become charity. This is a legal consequence, not an act. Yet once it becomes charity, he must give it away.

If he says, “Then my slave is free,” he has undertaken that the slave should become free. If, instead, he says, “Then I am bound to emancipate this slave,” what he has undertaken is the obligation of emancipation. Once it becomes obligatory, he must perform it. Nevertheless, he may have that obligation lifted.

When he says, “Then he is free,” he has undertaken freedom itself. Once the slave becomes free, he must let him go, just as, when a woman has been divorced three times, he must let her go and must neither be alone with her nor have intercourse with her. Thus, the person making the vow in this case has undertaken a legal consequence, and the act follows from it.

Then, when he performs what he has made obligatory upon himself—namely, bringing about the divorce or emancipation—it takes effect. Thus, the conditional stipulation entails an obligation, followed by the act that brings it about and its taking effect. If, however, he intends this conditional stipulation as an oath, it becomes an oath: the obligation does not bind him, he is not required to bring it about, and it does not take effect. If intending an oath prevents all three, then all the more should it prevent just one of them—namely, its taking effect.