Those who hold that divorce and emancipation take effect said:

The distinction between the two cases is that here he has undertaken a legal consequence—namely, that divorce or emancipation takes effect—whereas there he has undertaken an act of his own—namely, bringing it about. This is like saying, “I am bound to perform Hajj,” or “…to fast,” or “…to give charity.” With an act, he has the choice either to perform it or to refrain and offer expiation. A legal consequence, by contrast, rests with Allah Most High.

They said:

The permissibility of khulʿ (divorce in return for compensation) is established by explicit texts of the Quran and Sunnah. Thus, if a man tells his wife, “If you give me such-and-such, you are divorced,” and she gives it to him, the divorce takes effect. All other conditions are analogous: when divorce is made conditional upon them, it takes effect. Likewise, the permissibility of a contract of emancipation in return for payment is established by the Quran and Sunnah. The same principle applies when a man tells his slave, “If you give me a thousand, you are free,” and likewise when emancipation is made contingent upon any other condition.

This is the sum of their argument. The opposing scholars, however, say:

Your assertion that what becomes binding here is a legal consequence, whereas there it is an act, is mistaken. Rather, in both cases, what is made binding upon fulfilment of the condition is a legal consequence. In one case, however, it is something taking effect; in the other, it is an obligation. Thus, when someone says, “If I do such-and-such, I am bound to perform Hajj,” what follows is only the obligation to perform Hajj, not the actual performance of it.

It may further be said:

There is no difference between the consequence being a legal ruling and its being inseparably connected with one, as with a cause and the effect that necessarily follows from it. If someone declares that he is a Jew or a Christian if he does such-and-such, he has undertaken a legal consequence. Yet there is no disagreement that this does not become binding upon him when the condition is fulfilled.

Moreover, if he says, “If I do such-and-such, I am bound to fast,” or “…I am bound to perform Hajj,” the consequence is the obligation to fast and perform Hajj. Then, if performing it becomes binding upon him by virtue of its obligatory status, the obligation