and subsequently marries her, that she is not divorced. Thus, he distinguished between the two conditional declarations. One of his principles is that emancipation may be made conditional upon acquiring ownership, since it is an act of devotion, like a vow. It may therefore validly be made conditional upon acquiring ownership, as in Allah’s words:

“And among them are those who pledged to Allah, ‘If He gives us of His bounty, we will surely give in charity and be among the righteous.’”

Emancipation may itself be the purpose of acquiring ownership. Hence, the sale of a slave on condition that he be emancipated is valid. Divorce, by contrast, is not the purpose of marriage. If divorce were held to take effect upon marriage, the marriage would serve no purpose; and contracts that do not achieve their intended purpose are invalid. When Ahmad distinguished between divorce and emancipation in this matter, someone reporting his position assumed that the distinction arose from the exception clause invoking Allah’s will. This was a mistaken attribution to him.

The point here is that exception clauses in oaths involving divorce and emancipation take different forms. If someone says, “If I do such-and-such, my slave is free (or: my wife is divorced), if Allah wills,” the exception clause benefits him according to the sounder of the two reports from Ahmad. If he says, “Divorce shall be binding upon me: I will certainly do such-and-such, if Allah wills,” a group of Ahmad’s followers, including Abū Muhammad and Abū al-Barakāt, held that the exception clause benefits him here according to Ahmad’s sole reported position.

Others held that both reports apply to the oath formula and the conditional formula alike. This accords more closely with Ahmad’s statements, and it is also the position of Mālik and his followers, who hold two opinions concerning both forms.

Thus, if Ahmad, according to the sounder of the two reports from him, allows an exception clause in an oath involving emancipation—whether expressed in conditional form or in the form of an oath—while also holding that an exception clause applies only to an oath that admits expiation, it necessarily follows that such oaths admit expiation. He said, in the report of