such-and-such, I am a Jew or a Christian, or my wives are divorced, or my slaves are free, or everything I own is to be given in charity, or I must perform Hajj ten times, barefoot and bareheaded, according to the school of Mālik ibn Anas, or divorce is binding upon me according to the four schools, or such-and-such is binding upon me according to the strictest opinion.”

He may add: “I undertake not to consult anyone who would give me a ruling allowing expiation.” In his anger, he undertakes obligations from which he believes there will be no escape if he breaks his oath, so that their binding force will deter him from breaking it. Yet he never intends any of those consequences to befall him, whether the condition is fulfilled or not. If he believes that they are binding upon him, he accepts them because he believes himself bound by them, despite his aversion to assuming them—not because he wishes to assume them. Such is the person swearing an oath. Believing that the consequence is binding is different from intending it to become binding.

If, however, he intends the consequence to become binding when the condition is fulfilled, it becomes binding upon him in all cases, even if expressed in the form of an oath. Suppose he intends to divorce his wife if she does a particular thing, or if he himself does a particular thing, and says: “Divorce is binding upon me: you shall not do such-and-such.” If he intends that she should do it and thereby become divorced—rather than intending to forbid her from doing it—and is not averse to divorcing her but actually desires it, then she is divorced in this case. He is not, in reality, swearing an oath; rather, he is making divorce conditional upon that act, using the form of an oath. His words have the meaning of a conditional declaration intended to make divorce take effect. Thus, divorce takes effect here upon what constitutes a breach of the wording expressed as an oath, while his intention is that of a conditional declaration. Here, divorce only