leaving his religion, as when he says, “If I do such-and-such, I am a Jew,” or a Jew says, “If I do such-and-such, I am a Muslim”—then this is an oath, subject to the same ruling as the preceding form expressed explicitly as an oath, by agreement of the jurists.

An oath involves urging or restraining an action, affirming or denying something, by undertaking a consequence that the person swearing dislikes should he act contrary to his oath. A person is therefore only swearing an oath if he dislikes the consequence taking effect when the condition is fulfilled. If he intends the consequence to take effect when the condition is fulfilled, he is not swearing an oath: whether he desires only the condition and does not dislike its consequence, desires the consequence should the condition occur without desiring the condition itself, or desires both.

If, however, he dislikes the condition and dislikes the consequence altogether—disliking its occurrence and undertaking it only if the condition is fulfilled, in order to deter himself or someone else from the act stipulated as the condition, or to urge action by this means—then this is an oath.

If he intends divorce to take effect upon the occurrence of the stipulated outcome, as when he says, “If you give me a thousand, you are divorced,” “When you become free of menstruation, you are divorced,” or “If you commit adultery, you are divorced,” intending divorce to take effect if she commits that indecency, rather than merely swearing an oath concerning it, then this is not an oath. No expiation applies to this according to any jurist, as far as we know. Rather, according to the early generations and the majority of jurists, divorce takes effect through it when the condition is fulfilled.