my ailing loved one, I must free a slave,” or, “then my slave is free,” this becomes binding upon him by agreement. But if he says, “If I do such-and-such, I must free a slave,” or, “then my slave is free,” intending not to do it, this is where disagreement arises: must he free a slave in both cases, or is he not obliged to do so in either? Does expiation for an oath suffice? Or does expiation suffice when the obligation is made conditional, but not when emancipation itself is made conditional? These three positions also apply to divorce.

If a Jew says, “If I do such-and-such, I am a Muslim,” and then does it, he does not become a Muslim, by agreement, because the oath-taker has sworn by something whose occurrence would be binding upon him. The same applies when a Muslim says, “If I do such-and-such, my wives are divorced, my slaves are free, and I am a Jew,” while he hates to divorce his wives, free his slaves, or abandon his religion—even though the explicit ruling transmitted from the four imams is that emancipation takes effect.

It is well known that seven Companions—such as Ibn ʿUmar, Ibn ʿAbbās, Abū Hurayra, ʿĀʾisha, Umm Salama, Hafsa, and Zaynab, the Prophet’s stepdaughter, may Allah bless him and grant him peace—are more eminent than four Muslim scholars. If they and the leading scholars among the Successors say that the emancipation invoked in an oath is not binding upon him, and that expiation for an oath suffices, then this position—together with the evidence of the Quran and Sunnah—only supports this same conclusion.

How, then, can a person of knowledge and faith justifiably compel the community of Muhammad, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, to follow the weaker position in light of the Quran, the Sunnah, and sound legal analogies, given also the benefits to their religious and worldly affairs? For