and this is a less well-supported opinion, rejected by several Companions; the second argument supports those who rejected it. The same applies to enforcing the three divorce pronouncements. Anyone who regards ‘Umar’s position on this as binding religious law should be told:

This was his own independent judgment, which other Companions disputed. When they disagree over something, the matter must be referred back to Allah and the Messenger. The evidence supports those who rejected this less well-supported opinion.

Alternatively, ‘Umar may have imposed this as a punishment to be applied when needed. This is the more likely of the two explanations of his action. Such a punishment is itself subject to independent judgment in “two respects.”

First, is this form of punishment prescribed or not? A ruler may consider it appropriate to impose a punishment that another does not consider appropriate. Such was ‘Alī’s burning of the heretics, which Ibn ‘Abbās condemned. The majority of jurists agree with Ibn ‘Abbās.

Second, punishment applies only to those who deserve it. Someone who fears Allah deserves that Allah grant him relief and a way out; he does not deserve punishment. If someone did not know that combining three divorce pronouncements was forbidden, then repented upon learning that it was forbidden, resolving from that day onward to divorce only in accordance with the Sunnah, he is among those who fear Allah in matters of divorce. There is no justification for enforcing all three pronouncements against such a person; rather, only one is to be counted against him.

These are weighty questions. We have discussed them at length elsewhere in two volumes; here we have merely drawn brief attention to them.

The statements of the Companions should be understood in one of two ways:

Either they regarded this as a discretionary punishment that may be imposed according to need, such as imposing more than forty lashes for drinking wine.