disputed this with him, and many of their leading figures, including members of the consultative council and others, disagreed with him regarding both performing umrah followed by Hajj on the same journey and making three pronouncements of divorce binding. When they disagree over something, the matter in dispute must be referred to Allah and the Messenger. Similarly, Umar held that an irrevocably divorced woman was entitled to neither maintenance nor accommodation. Many Companions disagreed with him, and most scholars follow their position. He and Ibn Mas‘ūd also held that someone in a state of major ritual impurity could not perform dry ablution. Ammār, Abū Mūsā, Ibn Abbās, and other Companions disagreed with them, and the scholars unanimously adopted the latter view, since it was supported by the Quran and Sunnah. There is much to discuss on this subject, and it has been treated extensively elsewhere. The purpose here is to draw attention to the positions people have adopted.

Those who do not consider prohibited divorce binding say: This accords with the foundational principle followed by the leading jurists, such as Mālik, al-Shāfi‘ī, Ahmad, and others: concluding prohibited contracts does not make them binding. Examples include prohibited sales, prohibited marriages, and prohibited contracts by which slaves purchase their freedom. Accordingly, they invalidated shighār marriages (exchange marriages) and muhallil marriages (marriages intended to make a divorced woman lawful again for her former husband). Mālik and Ahmad also invalidated sales concluded at the call to Friday prayer.

This differs from the prohibited declaration of zihār (declaring one’s wife as forbidden as one’s mother), for that utterance is itself prohibited, just as slanderous accusations of unlawful sexual intercourse, false testimony, knowingly false oaths, and all other utterances that are themselves prohibited. Such speech cannot be divided into valid and invalid forms; rather, whoever utters it deserves punishment in every case. Thus, the person who pronounced zihār was punished by being required to offer expiation, while the divorce he intended by it did not take effect. They used it to intend divorce, which its wording entailed, but the Lawgiver nullified that effect because it was a prohibited utterance and required expiation for it.

Divorce, however, is lawful in principle, like marriage and sale: it is permissible in some circumstances and prohibited in others