after taking her back. To command a reconciliation that serves no purpose is something Allah and His Messenger are far above. If he desires the woman, he may take her back; but if he has no desire for her, he has no right to take her back. Thus, commanding him to take her back while holding the divorce binding serves no purpose recognised by the Sharia; rather, it causes further harm. The Messenger—may Allah bless him and grant him peace—must be held above commanding anything that necessarily causes further harm. Allah and His Messenger prohibited divorce contrary to the Sunnah precisely to prevent harm. How, then, could he command something that necessarily increases it?

The second group’s position accords more closely with the foundational principles and scriptural texts, for the position just discussed is self-contradictory. The principle upheld by the early generations and the jurists is that prohibited acts of worship and contracts, when performed in the prohibited manner, are not valid and binding. Although a group of speculative theologians disputed this, the correct position is that of the early generations and the leading jurists. For the Companions and those who followed them faithfully would infer the invalidity of acts of worship and punishments from the Lawgiver’s prohibition of them. This is abundantly attested in reports from them.

Furthermore, if prohibition did not indicate their invalidity, there would be nothing from the Lawgiver to distinguish the valid from the invalid. Those who said, “Prohibition does not entail invalidity,” said: “We determine the validity or invalidity of acts of worship and contracts by the Lawgiver’s designation of something as a condition, an impediment, or the like, and by His saying