the dowry customary for a woman of her standing, when this serves her interests. Some Shāfiʿī jurists have explicitly advanced a view within his school that, in the case of a minor virgin daughter, her father may secure her divorce by waiving half her dowry, if we hold that the person in whose hand is the marriage bond is the guardian. Others have judged this view mistaken, because he has authority to waive it only after divorce. Yet if he has authority to waive her entitlement after divorce without any benefit to her, then doing so for her benefit—by securing her release from her husband—is all the more permissible. Hence, all these scholars permit him to secure her release from her husband in exchange for some of his own property. Likewise, she may obtain a divorce from him in exchange for her own property if the husband guarantees that. If, then, he may secure her release, and no harm remains to her other than the forfeiture of half her dowry…

Mālik’s position can be derived from Ahmad’s principles in several ways. One is that, according to one of the two reported positions, a father may pronounce a divorce or arrange a compensated divorce on behalf of his young son, as groups among the early generations also held. Mālik permits compensated divorce, but not divorce without compensation, because compensated divorce involves an exchange.

Ahmad holds that the father may pronounce a divorce on his son’s behalf because this may serve the son’s interests by freeing him from his wife’s claims and the harm she causes him. Likewise, in waiving his rights, there is no distinction between financial and nonfinancial rights.

Furthermore, according to one of the two reported positions, an arbitrator in a marital dispute may arrange the wife’s release in exchange for some of her property without her permission, and pronounce a divorce on the husband’s behalf without his permission, as is the position of