before you have consummated the marriage with them, you have no waiting period to count against them.” Thus, He, glorified be He, explains that, when a waiting period is obligatory, it is a right the man holds over the divorced woman. Once he has consummated the marriage with her, he is entitled to require her to observe the waiting period on account of that consummation, and he has the right to take her back. In return, she is entitled to maintenance and accommodation, just as she is entitled to a compensatory gift on account of the divorce.

As for a woman whose separation was not by divorce, if she is entitled to neither maintenance, accommodation, nor a compensatory gift, and the husband has no right to take her back, freedom from pregnancy can be established by a single menstrual period, just as it is for enslaved women. Her being free makes no difference. This is demonstrated by the fact that, according to most jurists, a slave woman who has borne her master a child observes a waiting period of one menstrual period after her husband’s death, as Ibn ʿUmar and others held, even though she is free. A woman who has had intercourse under a mistaken assumption of its lawfulness is in no better position than she is. Likewise, a woman separated from her husband by means other than divorce, who is entitled to neither maintenance, accommodation, nor a compensatory gift, and whom he has no right to take back, is in the same position.

If it is objected: “This is contradicted by the case of a woman divorced for the third and final time. She is entitled to neither maintenance nor accommodation, and her husband has no right to take her back; yet she observes a waiting period of one menstrual period?”

The answer is: Such a divorced woman is entitled to a compensatory gift according to al-Shāfiʿī, Ahmad in one of the two reports from him, and many—or most—of the early generations. She is entitled to maintenance according to Mālik, al-Shāfiʿī, and many jurists of the Hijaz; this is also one of the two positions reported from Ahmad. In addition, she is entitled to accommodation according to many jurists of Iraq, such as Abū Hanīfah and others. Thus, according to the general body of scholars, she must be entitled to either a compensatory gift or accommodation. Requiring her to observe the waiting period in return for this therefore has a rationale that is absent when it is required of a woman entitled to neither a compensatory gift, maintenance, nor accommodation. It is also established that “the Prophet (may Allah bless him and grant him peace) instructed Fātimah bint Qays