as in the case of affinity through marriage, the resulting separation would count as a divorce. However, scholars have disagreed about many kinds of “separation,” such as “release for compensation,” “separation due to a difference in religion,” and “separation on account of a defect in the husband,” such as amputation of the penis, impotence, or similar conditions: does such a separation count as one of the three divorces or not? This disagreement concerns “refining” the “criterion distinguishing” divorce from other forms of separation. The positions of al-Shāfiʿī and Ahmad in this area are broader in scope than those of Abū Hanīfa and Mālik.

Thus, differing opinions are reported from both of them concerning release for compensation: is it a divorce or not? The well-known position reported from Ahmad is that it is not a divorce, in agreement with Ibn ʿAbbās, Tāwūs, and others. This is also one of al-Shāfiʿī’s two opinions. However, some followers of al-Shāfiʿī and Ahmad distinguished between a release expressed using the word “divorce” and one expressed otherwise. If the word “divorce” is used, it counts toward the three divorces. If another expression is used with the intention of divorce, it is likewise a divorce. If neither the wording nor the intention of divorce is present, that is the disputed case.

This matter requires careful examination, just as the criterion underlying the distinction requires precise clarification. For this position rests on two premises: “The first” is that the word “divorce” cannot be used with an intention other than a divorce that counts toward the three. “The second” is a precise definition of the meaning of release for compensation that distinguishes it from a divorce that counts toward the three. Otherwise, if it is assumed that the word “divorce” can signify a divorce that counts toward the three, but can also convey another meaning, and he intends