among the leading hadith scholars. By contrast, the report concerning triple divorce has a good chain of transmission. It is narrated by Ibn ‘Abbās and agrees with his hadith recorded in the Sahīh. Its transmitters were scholars versed in jurisprudence who acted upon its implications: Tāwūs, ‘Ikrimah, and Ibn Ishāq ruled that triple divorce counts as one. Some of them said: “This man has departed from the Sunnah and must therefore be brought back into conformity with it.”

As for Abū Dāwūd’s preference in his Sunan for the version mentioning “definitive” divorce, this was only because he did not mention this report of Dāwūd ibn al-Husayn, from ‘Ikrimah, from Ibn ‘Abbās. Instead, he mentioned another chain from ‘Ikrimah containing an unknown narrator. Thus, he preferred one unknown narrator’s report over another’s. This version narrated by Dāwūd ibn al-Husayn, however, takes precedence over that one by agreement of the specialists. Yet this chain of transmission did not reach most scholars, just as the hadith of Tāwūs is unknown to many jurists—indeed, to most of them.

This has been discussed at length elsewhere. The discussion of the rulings reported from ‘Umar, Ibn ‘Abbās, and other Companions, holding all three divorces binding, explained that this occurred when people began committing the prohibited act frequently and openly, so it was imposed as a punishment upon them. The scholarly discussion of “enforcing triple divorce” was also addressed: did those Companions who enforced it do so because it was a binding legal ruling established by the Prophet—may Allah bless him and grant him peace—or as a punishment for the open and widespread commission of wrongdoing?

If it is regarded as a punishment, does the ground for imposing it remain permanently, never ceasing, or does it vary with circumstances? It was explained that this cannot be a binding legal ruling or a binding punishment established through scholarly judgment. At most, it is a permissible but weaker scholarly judgment, or a temporary punishment