The view we have mentioned—that release for compensation is a rescission effecting an irrevocable separation, whatever wording is used—is the correct view, supported by the scriptural texts and legal principles. Accordingly, if a man separates from his wife for compensation several times, he may marry her again, whether he used the word “divorce” or some other expression.

If it is said, “The word ‘divorce’ explicitly denotes one of the three divorces, so it cannot serve as an indirect expression for release for compensation,” the answer is: only the unqualified expression has that explicit meaning. When a qualification removes it from that meaning, it explicitly denotes the qualified meaning instead. For example, he might say, “You are released from bonds,” or “from worries and sorrows.” This explicitly denotes that release, not divorce from marriage.

If he says, “You are divorced in exchange for one thousand,” and she says, “I accept,” the expression is qualified by the compensation and explicitly denotes release for compensation. It cannot possibly count as one of the three divorces. If he intends it to count as one of the three, he has intended by the expression a meaning it cannot bear—just as if he intended release for compensation to make her unlawful for him until she marries another husband. His intention to produce that legal effect is invalid; likewise, his intention that it count as one of the three divorces is invalid.

The same applies if he intends divorce by zihār (declaring one’s wife as forbidden as one’s mother), or a deferred divorce by īlā’ (an oath to abstain from marital intercourse), even though the people of the pre-Islamic era regarded both zihār and īlā’ as divorce. Allah and His Messenger invalidated that practice. In the case of īlā’, He ruled that the husband must either retain his wife honorably or release her graciously, with a waiting period of four months. In the case of zihār, He ruled that if the husband goes back on his declaration—as He has stated—he must make expiation before intimate contact; no divorce takes effect through it.

For this reason, the view of anyone who treats īlā’ as a deferred divorce, or treats a declaration of unlawfulness equivalent to zihār as divorce, is the weaker view and bears some resemblance to their former practice, unlike one who