Those holding this position then differed over whether, for khulʿ to constitute an annulment, it must involve neither the wording of divorce nor an intention to divorce. They held three views:

The first is that it must involve neither the wording of divorce nor an intention to divorce. Thus, if someone effects khulʿ using the wording of divorce, or intends divorce thereby, it counts as one of the three divorces. This is the position of most later scholars of the schools of al-Shāfiʿī and Ahmad. They may hold that, whenever it involves neither explicit wording of divorce nor an intention to divorce, it is an annulment. Or they may hold that it constitutes an annulment only when expressed using the terms khulʿ, faskh (annulment), or mufādāh (release in return for compensation), to the exclusion of all other expressions, such as firāq (separation), sarāh (release), ibānah (severance), and the other expressions through which alone a man separates from his wife.

Yet Ibn ʿAbbās referred to it only as fidyah (ransom), firāq (separation), and khulʿ. He said, “Khulʿ is separation, not divorce.” Ibn ʿAbbās did not call it an annulment, nor is it called an “annulment” in the Quran or Sunnah. How, then, can the word “annulment” explicitly denote it, but not the word “separation”? Likewise, Ahmad ibn Hanbal most often calls it “a separation that is not divorce.” He sometimes calls it an “annulment,” because this term became prevalent in the usage of later scholars.

The second is that, when it is expressed without the wording of divorce—for example, using “khulʿ,” “release in return for compensation,” or “annulment”—it constitutes an annulment, whether or not divorce was intended thereby. This view has been mentioned by several scholars of the schools of al-Shāfiʿī and Ahmad.

According to this position, does it constitute an annulment whenever explicit wording of divorce is absent, regardless of the expression or indirect wording used? Or is this restricted to the terms khulʿ, annulment, and release in return for compensation? There are two juristic views, corresponding to the two views under the first position.