with the intention of keeping her if she pleased him and parting with her otherwise, that would be permissible. However, this is not to be stipulated in the contract. If, instead, he stipulates that he will either retain her honourably or release her with kindness, this is already what the contract requires under Islamic law. Such a condition is valid according to the majority of scholars, and he is bound by what the Law requires. This resembles the Prophet’s stipulation, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, in a sale contract:

“A Muslim’s sale to another Muslim, free of disease, deception, or unlawful taint.”

This, too, is already required by the contract.

Al-Hasan ibn Alī divorced frequently, so perhaps he intended, when marrying most of his wives, to divorce them after a time. Yet no one said that this was temporary marriage. The man under discussion likewise does not intend to divorce her at a specified time, but when his purpose in marrying her and staying in that town has been fulfilled. Even supposing that he intended to divorce her at a particular time, his intention might change. Nothing here makes the marriage fixed-term or turns it into a lease for a specified period.

If the resolve to divorce arose after the marriage contract, it would not invalidate the marriage, nor would his remaining with the woman be considered disliked—even if he intended to divorce her. We know of no disagreement on this, although scholars differ concerning a fixed term introduced into an existing marriage, as when a man stipulates that their divorce will take effect at a future time. There are two opinions on this, both reported from Ahmad.

The first is that the separation takes effect immediately. This is Mālik’s view, so that the marriage does not become fixed-term.

The second is that it does not take effect immediately, because this time limit was introduced after the marriage had been established, and continuing an existing marriage has greater legal force than initiating one. Thus, a waiting period, apostasy, and the state of consecration for pilgrimage prevent a marriage from being initiated, but not from continuing. Consequently, prohibiting a fixed term at the outset does not necessarily entail prohibiting it once the marriage is established. It may, however, be objected that some impediments prevent both continuation and initiation. This is therefore a matter for juristic reasoning, just as scholars have differed concerning