unless it is itself to be sacrificed, because the sanctity of the sacrifice attaches to that particular animal.
Al-Khiraqī said:
“Once an animal has been designated as an Eid sacrifice, it may be exchanged for a better one.”
Al-Qādī Abū Yaʿlā said in al-Taʿlīq:
“If a man designates a badanah (a camel or cow) as a sacrificial offering, he may sell it, but must provide another badanah in its place. If he does not designate its replacement until it has grown in body or hair, or has given birth, he must provide an animal equivalent to it, including that increase, and offspring equivalent to its offspring. But if he designates its replacement before that growth or birth, nothing is due from him for the increase.”
I know of no one among Ahmad’s followers who disagreed with this except Abū al-Khattāb, who adopted the position that replacing it is impermissible. He said:
“If a man vows to offer an Eid sacrifice and specifies the animal, his ownership of it ceases, and he may neither sell nor exchange it. The same applies if he vows to free a particular slave or makes a vow concerning specified dirhams.”
He said:
“In my view, this is what follows by analogy from the school’s principles, because specifying the object has the same force as an explicit stipulation in a vow, which cannot be annulled. For Ahmad expressly stated, in the reports of Sālih and Ibrāhīm ibn al-Hārith, concerning someone who vows to sacrifice a particular animal which subsequently loses the sight of one eye or develops a defect: ‘It fulfils his obligation.’ Had it remained his property, it would not have fulfilled his obligation, and he would have been required to provide a sound animal, just as if he had made an unrestricted vow to offer a sacrifice.”
He said:
“Likewise, in Hanbal’s report, he expressly stated concerning a pilgrimage offering that becomes incapacitated within the Sacred Precinct: ‘It fulfils his obligation.’ Had it remained his property, it would not have fulfilled his obligation, and a replacement would have been required. There are other such rulings as well. All this supports what I have said.”
Abū al-Khattāb based this on the premise that the man’s ownership of the animal had ceased, and that replacing it is therefore impermissible once ownership has ceased. This is also the position of the followers of Mālik and al-Shāfiʿī. Abū Hanīfah permits replacing it with a better one. His followers, together with al-Qādī Abū Yaʿlā and those who agree with him, based this on the premise that the man’s ownership of the animal had not ceased. The dispute between the two groups concerns this underlying premise. Ahmad and the jurists among his followers