An analogous case is that of someone who endows property decorated with carvings, marble, woodwork, or other embellishments that increase its price. It may be sold and its proceeds used to purchase something more beneficial to the endowment’s beneficiaries. What matters, then, is what benefits them most. That silver may be more beneficial to its purchaser, since the benefit a private owner derives differs from that derived by the endowment’s beneficiaries. This is why an endowed property that has fallen into ruin may be sold when it no longer serves its purpose. It is well known that something wholly devoid of benefit cannot lawfully be sold. Here, however, its benefit has ceased for the endowment’s beneficiaries, but not for a private owner: the beneficiaries seek rental income or accommodation, neither of which is possible while the property lies in ruins, whereas a private owner may purchase it and restore it at his own expense.

There are two positions in Ahmad’s school concerning such ornamentation, including the ornamentation of helmets, body armour, sword belts, and similar military equipment. The equipment of horses used in jihad is treated like that of the fighters themselves.

This report from Ahmad indicates that it is permissible to adorn horse equipment, such as saddles and bridles, with silver. He permitted such equipment to be endowed, while considering it preferable to sell it and devote its proceeds to endowing similar items. Had he not regarded it as permissible, no choice between the two would have been offered.

Al-Qādī said in al-Mujarrad: “The apparent meaning of this is that he held the endowment of the silver on the bridle and saddle to be invalid, because using it is forbidden. This differs from jewellery whose use is permissible. He allowed its proceeds to be spent on items of the same kind as those endowed—saddles and bridles—but prohibited spending them on the horse’s upkeep, since that is not of the same kind as the endowed property.”

Al-Qādī based this on the view that such ornamentation is forbidden, and that if someone endows something whose use is forbidden, it should be sold and its proceeds used to purchase something whose use is permissible, which is then endowed for the same purpose. Clearly, were the endowment contract not understood to allow replacement in the interests of the endowment, this would not be permissible. Similarly, in the case of sale