a stipulated qualifying characteristic—for example, if the beneficiaries were required to be Muslim, morally upright, or poor—his share would pass to his child despite the impediment, just as it would in its absence.

Moreover, something may be attributed to someone on the strength of even the slightest connection, so it is valid to call it “his share” in this sense. Interpreting the wording this way also means that the founder’s statement encompasses every situation that may arise; this is preferable to interpreting it as leaving some situations unmentioned. It also accords with the sequence expressed in the wording. Yet that is not what ordinary people who make such stipulations understand from it.

This is also what reasoned consideration and theoretical analogy dictate in people’s stipulations concerning the entitlement of an orphaned grandchild, neither he nor his father having inherited anything from the grandfather. The founder therefore considers compensating him by granting him entitlement in that case; for he would then be included in what his father inherited from the estate and what passed to him by inheritance. This intention of theirs also accords with the Lawgiver’s purpose. Hence, they often make bequests for a child in this situation.

If it is said that this wording encompasses only what the deceased actually became entitled to, this would be an inference from an express statement framed in terms of the usual case, and no contrary implication may therefore be drawn from it. Since it carries no contrary implication, the case in question is left unaddressed in this passage.

It may, however, be encompassed by the founder’s statement:

“For Zayd, then for his children, then for their children’s children.”

We have explained that this wording, together with his subsequent statement that the deceased’s share passes to his child, explicitly indicates that individuals are intended to succeed individuals. The meaning is therefore: “For Zayd, then for his children, then for the child of each one