matching one plural with another implies that their individual members correspond to one another, as in the expressions: “People put on their clothes” and “People mounted their riding animals.”

This is certainly the intended meaning in the case under discussion, since the founder expressly stipulated that whenever one of these beneficiaries died leaving a child, his share would pass to his child. Thus, in this expressly qualified case, individuals are intended to succeed individuals, without any disagreement; the disagreement concerns only an unqualified provision.

Accordingly, where entitlement follows an order of succession—whether established by Islamic law or by a stipulation in a bequest, an endowment, or otherwise—the only condition for its passing to the second is that the first should not be entitled. This applies whether the first existed and was entitled, existed but was not entitled, or never existed at all. This is exemplified by what the jurists state concerning the order of precedence among agnatic relatives, marriage guardians, those entitled to custody, and others: the son has the entitlement, then his son, however far down the line of descent, then the father, then his father, however far up the line of ascent. If the nearer relative is absent or is disqualified by unbelief or slavery, the right passes to the next in order. For the right to pass to the next, it is not a condition that the first should previously have been entitled to it.

The same applies if someone says: “Oversight of this is entrusted to so-and-so, then to so-and-so or to his son.” Whenever the first lacks entitlement to oversight owing to his absence, insanity, or unbelief, it passes to the second, whether the latter is his son or someone else. The same applies to the order of precedence among agnatic relatives in inheritance, inheritance through patronage, custody, and other matters.