his share would pass to his child, then to his grandchild, then to his descendants and posterity; if he did not, it would pass to his siblings, then to their children. The latter category should therefore encompass everything not included in the first, so that the provisions cover all circumstances. This is the apparent intention of the speaker; otherwise, cases would be left unprovided for, provisions rendered inoperative, and—according to one view—the endowment invalidated. The circumstances rule out this possibility. If the latter category encompasses everything excluded from the first, it includes anyone who has no child, anyone whose child has no child, and anyone who has no posterity. Accordingly, whichever of these four has no posterity, his share passes to his siblings, then to his posterity.

Furthermore, the founder expressly stated that if any of them died without posterity, his share would pass to his siblings, then to their children. This intention does not differ between someone who leaves no child and someone who leaves a child who, in turn, leaves a child. A reasonable person does not intend to distinguish between these two circumstances. Consistent experience establishes that a reasonable person does not intend to treat equivalent cases differently, so his words must not be interpreted in that way. Rather, they should be understood according to what the circumstances and established custom indicate, unless the wording supports a more compelling interpretation. Since the absence of descendants from the outset and their subsequent extinction are equivalent with respect to the share passing to the siblings, the wording must be understood accordingly.

Know that anyone who examines the matter closely will recognize with certainty, from the circumstances, that this alone is what the founder intended