reasons. First, by a fortiori reasoning: their father is closer both to the deceased and to the founder of the endowment. If the share is not transferred to the nearer relative, there is all the more reason not to transfer it to the more distant one.

Second, whether the stipulated order of succession applies to the beneficiaries collectively or individually, they are not entitled in these circumstances: the preceding generation has not died out, and their fathers have not died.

Third, in these circumstances they are not among the beneficiaries of the endowment. What they would receive in their own right has not yet passed to them, so what they would receive derivatively cannot pass to them either.

As for the paternal uncles, the deceased could not conceivably have been entitled to anything while his paternal uncles were alive except according to our position. Thus, the very scenario is impossible on the opposing party’s view.

Since the existence of paternal uncles entails the validity of this position, it cannot also entail something that invalidates it. One and the same thing cannot entail both the validity and the invalidity of a position.

It may, however, be said: “The first deceased left only siblings and a child. Then his child died, leaving a child of his own and paternal uncles.”

We reply: excluding the siblings when there is a child implies that the paternal uncles are likewise excluded.

This is the substance of the answer: excluding his siblings implies the exclusion of his paternal uncles, as explained above.

The second ground—ruling out an interruption in entitlement—is that assigning the deceased’s share to his siblings rather than to the other beneficiaries of the endowment implies that it should be assigned to his child, as explained above.