Thus, since he stipulated succession here in his initial wording—bearing in mind that a rational person would not draw distinctions in such a case, but would rely on what he mentioned at the outset—repeating the condition was merely a matter of latitude in expression. Our purpose here, however, is to establish this point.

Third:

Even if we concede that it entails shared entitlement among the conjoined terms, this does not entail that the two clauses differ regarding the provision they share by virtue of the conjunction. At most, this means that he treated the fourth generation and all subsequent generations as a single class, just as the offspring of the elder and the younger were grouped together within the first generation. The elder and younger children form a single class; he did not make some succeed others on the basis of age.

His statement, “This entails that it differs from the first clause regarding succession,” is therefore ambiguous.

If he means that this clause differs from those clauses in how it treats its individual members, that is not so. Rather, it is a clause encompassing its members on the basis of shared entitlement, not succession.

If he means that no other clause was made to follow this one in succession, then the first clause was not made to follow any other. This is simply a necessary consequence of its being the final clause, not a material distinction—just as the first clause’s not being made to follow another was not a material distinction.

If he means that this clause encompasses generations at different levels, unlike the earlier clauses, that distinction concerns neither the meaning conveyed by the wording nor the provision indicated by it. Moreover, even greater disparities may arise within the earlier clauses. There may, for example, be twenty grandchildren, with seventy years between the eldest and the youngest, and the eldest may have