Once it is established that the exception’s application to all the clauses is textually indicated—in the sense that this is the wording’s apparent meaning—the desired point is proved. The purpose here is not to establish this issue, but only to identify the points open to challenge. The argument he mentioned applies to every restriction introduced by an attached qualification: preserving the general scope of the qualified wording is no more deserving than preserving the general scope of the qualifying wording. Indeed, the latter is more deserving, since it is a general expression whose general scope remains intact. Moreover, repeating the qualification after every clause is stylistically objectionable.
Thus, if someone were to say:
“I have established an endowment for my children, on condition that, if any of them dies leaving offspring or leaving none, his share shall pass to his offspring or to those of his own generation; then for my grandchildren on this condition; then for my great-grandchildren on this condition,”
this would be regarded as wording for which more eloquent and better alternatives exist.
We then say to anyone who disputes our position:
It is known with certainty that founders of endowments generally intend the condition to apply to every generation. Yet they do not use this unusual formulation; rather, they confine themselves to the wording mentioned at the outset. Were that insufficient to convey their intentions, they would not have confined themselves to it. Allah bears witness—and Allah suffices as a witness—that we know with certainty that the reasoning in the matter before us is conclusive, not a matter of conjectural reasoning. Yet Allah, glorified is He, has the power to make what is certainty to some ignorance to others. Discussing this is regarded as needless elaboration. Had the need not arisen because some imagine that those who dispute this matter have grounds to rely upon, or that it is a matter open to independent legal judgment, we would not have discussed it at such length.