a ruling is in doubt, that ruling is not established. There can be no unequivocal wording while modification remains possible, especially when that possibility is so strong that most scholars regard it as the more likely interpretation.”

If he says, “The ground for including them is present, while the impediment to excluding them is uncertain,” I reply: According to those who deny that an effective cause can admit exceptions, I do not concede that the ground for including them is present. That ground consists of wording unaccompanied by anything that excludes them. I cannot know that this wording is unaccompanied by anything that excludes them until I know that this exception does not exclude them; and this condition remains uncertain.

According to those who allow such exceptions, however, I concede that the ground is present, but its producing an effect depends on the absence of a counteracting impediment. Here, something capable of constituting such an impediment exists. Until evidence establishes otherwise, it remains capable of counteracting; without such evidence, the ground does not produce its effect. Mere capacity to counteract confers no advantage. This is precisely the debate between those who hold that an exception applies to all the clauses and those who restrict it to the final clause.

He then begins afresh: If, for example, someone says, “I dedicate this endowment to my children, then to the poor, except the sinful,” the disputant says: “‘My offspring’ unequivocally denotes his children, whereas ‘the sinful’ may refer exclusively to the poor.”

We reply: This is countered by an equivalent argument. “The sinful” unequivocally denotes all sinful people, since it is a collective noun with the definite article. Since it is general, it must encompass every sinful person. The claim that it refers exclusively to the sinful among the poor, rather than among the children, therefore requires evidence restricting its scope.