If he says, “The general applicability of the preceding clauses has been established, so it may not be restricted on the basis of an uncertain possibility”—our purpose here is not to refute this argument. Rather, we say that its necessary implication is that qualifying expressions apply exclusively to the final clause in all cases. Nothing in this argument warrants any distinction whatsoever between one coordinating particle and another.

What distinction would reasonable people draw when someone says, “I establish an endowment for my children and for the poor, unless they are sinful”?

Indeed, the proponent of this view may have come to consider it more likely that the exception applies exclusively to the final clause, yet feared contradicting al-Shāfiʿī, so that his own preference troubled him. We have, however, already explained that our case does not fall within the disputed area. The disagreement concerns only exceptions or grammatical adjectival qualifications. As for conditions and conditional qualifications, there is no disagreement among the jurists concerning them.

In short, if someone concedes that an exception applies to all the clauses coordinated by wāw, his invocation of this argument invalidates his own concession and therefore cannot be accepted. Conceding a ruling necessarily entails conceding the invalidity of whatever establishes its opposite. Thus, no argument from him establishing that the exception does not apply to all the clauses can be accepted.

Second: His assertion, “The exception certainly applies to those immediately preceding it,” is not conceded. Rather, the exception may apply exclusively to the first clause when evidence indicates this. The speaker may intend and mean precisely that, even if