with reference to all the preceding referents, and that this is what the wording conveys. Moreover, those who hold this view distinguish this case from divorce in several respects.

First: In divorce, the condition is attached to the verb, which is … (1), and all those nouns joined by conjunctions fall within the scope of this verb. In meaning, they are its objects. This is comparable to a condition attached to an oath. If someone says:

“By Allah, I shall certainly do such-and-such and such-and-such, then such-and-such, if Allah wills,”

the condition is attached to the verb in the clause expressing what is sworn to, and the objects fall within the scope of its exception. The verb applies equally to all its objects. Thus, if its application to them is restricted by a qualification, its application to all of them is subject to that qualification.

This differs from saying:

“You are divorced, then divorced, if Zayd wills.”

Here, what is attached to the condition is the active participle, not the subject itself. The second predicate does not fall within the predication of the other predicate; rather, both are predicated of the subject. This is why disagreement arises here. The distinction is clear to anyone who reflects upon it.

Second: The condition in divorce—namely, the words “if you enter the house”—contains nothing requiring it to apply to all the clauses. This differs from the words “on condition that whoever among them dies,” since the pronoun requires reference back to all those mentioned.

Third: In divorce, neither of the two clauses is dependent upon the other, for