uphold the divorce that has taken effect?” Indeed, there is greater reason in the case of divorce to restrict the condition to the final clause, because the occurrence of either divorce does not depend on the other; both can be effected simultaneously. This is unlike grandchildren, who can only come into existence in generational succession. Here, therefore, there is a need to specify sequence that does not arise in divorce.

Moreover, it is agreed that conditions may validly be appended to a sale, an endowment, and similar transactions. Divorce is different: Shurayh and a group who share his view hold—and this is also a less-preponderant report from Ahmad—that divorce cannot validly be made contingent upon a condition stated after it. Similarly, some jurists among the followers of … (1) and others held that an exception cannot validly be made to a pronouncement of divorce. If, then, they have applied the condition to all the clauses joined in sequence by thumma (“then”), there is all the more reason to do so in other cases. For anyone who reflects upon it, this argument uproots the very foundation of the position of those who attribute a contrary view to al-Shāfiʿī’s school.

If it is said:
“But some Hanafī and Hanbalī jurists have held that view; do they also hold it here?”

We reply:
We have already explained that, according to the legal principles of all these scholars, the pronoun refers back to all the preceding referents, since evidence establishes that reference on the grounds that the pronoun is used in its literal sense