on Allah’s will.

The same applies if he says, “I shall certainly strike Zayd, then ‘Amr, then Bakr—if Allah wills.”

Likewise, if he says, “He pledges to do such-and-such on pain of divorce, and to do such-and-such on pain of his slave’s freedom, or to do such-and-such on pain of his wife being to him as his mother’s back—if Allah wills.” Their disagreement concerns only restrictive exceptions, not conditional exceptions.

The provision under discussion is a conditional exception, like a stipulation, for several reasons:

First: An exception introduced by illā (“except”) or similar particles applies to nouns, not to the statement as a whole. An exception introduced by conditional particles, however, applies to the statement as a whole. The expression “provided that” and similar expressions apply to the statement as a whole, so they resemble conditional particles more closely than the particles of exception, illā and its counterparts.

Thus, in the statement, “I establish an endowment for my children, except Zayd,” the exception applies to “my children.” But in the statement, “I establish an endowment for my children if they are poor,” the condition applies to the words “I establish an endowment”—that is, to the statement and its composite meaning. The same applies to “provided that they are poor”: the preposition ‘alā (“upon”), which expresses elevation, makes the meaning of the statement—“I establish an endowment”—dependent on the condition. This is conclusive for anyone who reflects upon it.

Second: This explains the conditions of the endowment upon which entitlement depends. Its purpose is not to exclude some of those encompassed by the wording. These are therefore conditions in substance.

Third: His statement, “Whoever among them dies leaving no child, his share shall pass to those of his generation,” is a conditional sentence expressing a condition and its consequence, serving as the predicate of anna (“that”), pronounced with an initial a; and the subject of anna is a pronoun