The fifth argument:

If he says, “I establish an endowment for my children, then for their children, then for their children’s children, subject to the provision that whoever among them dies leaving a child or leaving no child,” referring the pronoun to the third generation alone would favor one interpretation without any grounds for doing so. It is apparent—indeed, certain—that a rational person would not do this, for a rational person does not distinguish between equivalent cases without a reason.

He may intend to give priority to those closest to him, followed by the next closest, throughout all generations, if the deceased’s share is transferred to his son in every generation. But that he should favor those closest to him in some generations, while in others transferring the share to the deceased’s child or to those of the deceased’s generation, is something scarcely any rational person would intend.

When wording admits either an interpretation that was apparently intended or one that was apparently not intended, it must be understood according to the apparent intention. Wording is acted upon only because it indicates what is intended. Thus, when it is inherently open to more than one interpretation and one of the two becomes more likely, it must be understood accordingly. If, in addition, the restrictive interpretation limits a general expression to certain individuals whose relationship to the founder’s purpose is no different from that of the others, this is virtually conclusive evidence of its general scope.

The sixth argument:

This qualification has the force of a condition, and a condition following several clauses applies to all of them by agreement of the jurists. No weight need be given here to the disagreement of certain later scholars.

The jurists have expressly stated that if a man says, “By Allah, I shall do such-and-such, and I shall do such-and-such—if Allah wills,” both acts would be contingent