general scope; the question concerns only the nature of that scope. Indeed, our interpretation gives it a broader scope, because each grandchild receives a share both during the lifetime of his paternal uncles and after their death. On the other interpretation, he receives a share only during their lifetime. Wording that includes them in both circumstances is more general than wording that includes them in only one.

Third:

Even supposing that this falls under “conflict between general wording and implied meaning,” the correct position is that an implied meaning of this kind takes precedence over general wording. This is the view of most Mālikī, Shāfiʿī and Hanbalī scholars. Some have even reported a consensus on this among those who recognize implied meaning as evidence, because implied meaning constitutes specific evidence, and specific evidence takes precedence over general evidence. Disagreement over the authority of implied meaning is immaterial here: clear analogy takes precedence over implied meaning, even though those who reject analogy are nearly as numerous as those who reject implied meaning. Likewise, a solitary report can restrict the general scope of the Quran, even though those who reject solitary reports are more numerous than those who reject the general wording of the Quran.

If it is said:

“What you have stated rests on the assumption that the pronoun in his statement, ‘provided that whoever dies,’ refers to everyone previously mentioned. This is not conceded, for some recognized jurists have said: ‘When an exception in the endower’s stipulations follows a series of coordinated clauses …’ (1) If the pronoun refers to the final clause, do the preceding clauses not retain their original ordering?”