For this reason, those who reject implied meaning nevertheless appeal to implied meanings in many instances, since they do not deny that an intention to restrict the ruling may be apparent in some such cases. This is one of them. His statement, “Whoever among them dies leaving no child,” may suggest both possibilities, and he has a purpose in stating the condition. This is not an implicit indication that the ruling extends to the other case: if he stipulates that the deceased’s share passes to his siblings when he leaves no child, it does not follow that he would transfer it to them when the deceased does leave a child. Moreover, there is a need to clarify both cases. Indeed, if he regarded the two cases as equivalent—yet specifically mentioned the case of the father’s absence—he would be creating confusion and obscurity, since his wording would suggest the opposite of his intention. This difficulty does not arise if the wording is understood as restricting the ruling.
Fourth:
When an attribute is relevant to a ruling, this indicates that it is the ruling’s operative cause. The deceased’s having left no child is relevant to transferring his entitlement to those of his tier. This therefore indicates that the operative cause of the transfer to those of his tier is his dying without leaving a child. Accordingly, this transfer ceases to apply when its operative cause is absent—that is, when there is a child.
Fifth:
Everyone who hears this statement understands it as restricting the ruling. This establishes that such restriction is its literal meaning according to customary usage, whether that meaning is original to the language or subsequently acquired through a shift in usage. In either case, the jurists agree that the words of those making legal dispositions must be understood accordingly. Know that establishing this in this particular case does not require demonstrating that implied meaning constitutes evidence, since those who dispute implied meaning merely deny that implied meanings are universally authoritative