which demonstrate to anyone who reflects that implied meaning, like generality, unrestricted wording, and qualification, is one of the ways in which words convey meaning. This is evident in the statements of the scholars. Analogical reasoning, however, is not among the ways words convey meaning as understood through language; it acquires evidentiary force only through the Lawgiver’s textual authorization. Implied meaning, by contrast, has evidentiary force in the language itself, and the Lawgiver explained the rulings in the language of the Arabs.

Second:

This implication arises from a specific qualifying attribute mentioned after a general noun. Many who rejected implication from an independently stated attribute accepted it in this case. Indeed, this form of implication is authoritative even in the case of a non-derived noun, as al-Shāfiʿī and Ahmad argued on the basis of the Prophet’s words, may Allah bless him and grant him peace:

“The earth has been made a place of prayer for me,” and, “Its soil has been made a means of purification.”

For if someone says, “People are of two kinds: Muslim and unbeliever. As for the Muslim, you must treat him kindly,” it is necessarily understood that the speaker intended to single out the Muslim for this ruling. This differs from saying at the outset, “You must treat the Muslim kindly.” Here, one might suppose that he mentioned the Muslim merely in keeping with customary usage, because it is usually the ruling concerning him that needs clarification, as in his words:

“A Muslim is inviolable to another Muslim in every respect: his blood, his property, and his honour.”

Likewise, “Zakah is due on grazing camels” conveys a stronger implication than “Zakah is due on grazing livestock.” For when someone says, “On grazing camels,” if the ruling concerning them were the same whether or not they grazed, he would have lengthened the wording while diminishing the meaning conveyed. By contrast,