such-and-such an item,” this explains his words, “I have sold it to you for a thousand,” and is equivalent to saying, “For a thousand secured by a pledge.”

The third argument:

His statement, “On condition that, if any of them dies without leaving a child, his share shall pass to those of his generation,” indicates that if any of them dies leaving a child, his share does not pass to those of his generation. This is an inference from the implied meaning of the words. This is not the place to establish the validity of such inference, but we shall mention a few points sufficient for the present purpose.

First:

Accepting this form of inference is the position of the majority of jurists, both earlier and later, among the Mālikīs, Shāfiʿīs, and Hanbalīs. Indeed, these imams explicitly affirmed it. Only groups of speculative theologians, together with some jurists, disagreed. The positions attributed to the jurists’ schools must therefore accord with their foundational principles. Anyone who attributes the contrary position to these schools is mistaken. If, however, he is exercising independent juristic judgment in what he says, he must possess the requisite qualifications for doing so.

Particularly astonishing is some people’s belief that implied meaning is authoritative in the Lawgiver’s speech but not in human speech, as is the case with analogical reasoning. This contradicts the consensus: people either hold that implied meaning is one of the ways in which words convey meaning, or hold that it is not. This distinction, however, is newly introduced. Moreover, those who regard it as authoritative hold that it is authoritative in speech generally. To establish its authority, they have cited human speech, the statements of language scholars, and rational arguments